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the basis of such a requirement are better explained otherwise. In this paper I invoke the legal force of
contractual disclaimers to show that contractual obligations are indeed voluntary. When parties to an
agreement purport to exclude it from the reach of the law by expressly disavowing an intention to bind
themselves legally, they have issued a disclaimer. An unambiguous disclaimer will preclude an agreement from
being enforced as a contract. Contractual obligations are thus “disclaimer-sensitive”. I argue that this striking
feature of contractual obligations can be plausibly explained only if contractual obligations are voluntary.
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Disclaimers of Contractual Liability and
Voluntary Obligations

MICHAEL G PRATT*
Contractual obligations are traditionally regarded as voluntary. A voluntary obligation is
one that can be acquired only if one intends to acquire it. This traditional understanding
éQGVGRFWULQDOH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWFRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHVLQWHQGWRFUHDWHOHJDO
relations. It has, however, been doubted that the Anglo-Canadian law of contract insists
RQ WKLV UHTXLUHPHQW 6NHSWLFV DUJXH WKDW FDVHV RVWHQVLEO\ GHFLGHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI VXFK D
UHTXLUHPHQWDUHEHWWHUH[SODLQHGRWKHUZLVH,QWKLVSDSHU,LQYRNHWKHOHJDOIRUFHRIFRQWUDFWXDO
GLVFODLPHUV WR VKRZ WKDW FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQV DUH LQGHHG YROXQWDU\ :KHQ SDUWLHV WR DQ
DJUHHPHQWSXUSRUWWRH[FOXGHLWIURPWKHUHDFKRIWKHODZE\H[SUHVVO\GLVDYRZLQJDQLQWHQWLRQ
WRELQGWKHPVHOYHVOHJDOO\WKH\KDYHLVVXHGDGLVFODLPHU$QXQDPELJXRXVGLVFODLPHUZLOO
SUHFOXGHDQDJUHHPHQWIURPEHLQJHQIRUFHGDVDFRQWUDFW&RQWUDFWXDOREOLJDWLRQVDUHWKXV
ÛGLVFODLPHUVHQVLWLYHÜ , DUJXH WKDW WKLV VWULNLQJ IHDWXUH RI FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQV FDQ EH
SODXVLEO\H[SODLQHGRQO\LIFRQWUDFWXDOREOLJDWLRQVDUHYROXQWDU\
On a toujours considéré volontaires les obligations contractuelles. Une obligation volontaire
HQHVWXQHTXLQHSHXWWUHDFTXLVHTXHVÙLOH[LVWHXQHLQWHQWLRQGHOÙDFTX¬ULU&HWWHLQWHUSU¬WDWLRQWUDGLWLRQQHOOHWLUHVHVUDFLQHVGRFWULQDOHVGHOÙH[LJHQFHTXÙLOH[LVWHHQWUHOHVSDUWLHVDX
FRQWUDWXQHLQWHQWLRQGHFU¬HUGHVUHODWLRQVMXULGLTXHV,OHVWWRXWHIRLVGRXWHX[TXHOHGURLW
DQJORFDQDGLHQGHVFRQWUDWVLQVLVWHVXUFHWWHH[LJHQFH/HVVFHSWLTXHVSU¬WHQGHQWTXHOHV
MXJHPHQWV RVWHQVLEOHPHQW IRQG¬V VXU FHWWH H[LJHQFH SHXYHQW SOXV IDFLOHPHQW VÙH[SOLTXHU
DXWUHPHQW 'DQV FHW DUWLFOH MÙLQYRTXH OD FRQWUDLQWH MXULGLTXH GHV FODXVHV GÙH[RQ¬UDWLRQ
SRXUG¬PRQWUHUTXHOHVREOLJDWLRQVFRQWUDFWXHOOHVVRQWHIIHFWLYHPHQWYRORQWDLUHV/RUVTXH

*

I am grateful to participants in the 2014 International Conference on Contracts in Miami
for comments on an earlier draft, to Jamie Cameron for pressing me to clarify certain points
in the paper, and to Warren Whiteknight for his research assistance. An earlier version
of this article was originally presented at the Symposium in Honour of John McCamus:
Scholarship, Teaching and Leadership (7 February 2013), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto.
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I WAS ONCE A FIRST-YEAR STUDENT AT OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL. That was

a long time ago, but it often occurs to me that a significant part of my life now,
all these years later, is a product of a single, arbitrary decision by an administrator
at Osgoode to place me in the contract law course taught by Professor McCamus.
I could not have known it at the time, but having been in this business for
a while now, it is all too clear to me just how rare is the quality of instruction
Professor McCamus provided to his first-year charges in that course on contracts.
Several aspects of the course remain prominent for me. Professor McCamus took
us seriously as thoughtful future participants in the business of making the law.
He engaged with us, pressing us to articulate principles from the cases and to say
whether we thought the courts were getting things right or wrong. We knew we
were part of something more than a merely academic pursuit—that our thoughts
on the often arcane doctrines we were learning could come to really matter in the
world. But I was most struck by what Professor McCamus revealed to us about
the other side of this coin—about what it is to engage in a serious academic
study of the law. I knew there were folks called “law professors” who apparently
understood a lot about the law. But I did not imagine that the law could be
subjected to the same sort of careful, exacting, and critical scrutiny that professors
in disciplines like philosophy and the sciences bring to bear on their subjects.
And yet that is exactly what Professor McCamus was doing, and encouraging us
to do, in that first-year classroom.
Here was a brilliant teacher inviting us to see cases as arguments for
propositions, to formulate the bases for those arguments, and to evaluate them.
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He did not confine himself within the bounds of the subject that he was assigned
to teach. He would routinely venture across the contract boundary into tort,
restitution, property, equity, and everything in between (the remarkable depth
and breadth of his knowledge were apparent even to a first-year student) to draw
contrasts and trace principles to their roots. It was exhilarating. No single course
I have ever taken inspired me towards a career thinking and writing about the
law more than that one did. And it is no coincidence that contract law is the field
in which I do most of my research and teaching. I came away from Professor
McCamus’s course with a sense that the law of contract is venerable, fundamental,
and challenging, and that it might even be beautiful if one could see the whole
of it clearly enough. I left no other course in law school feeling even remotely
the same way (as much as I enjoyed many of them). Perhaps no other law school
subject could leave such an impression on a student. I will leave that idea alone.
But even if contract law is a jewel in the common law, rare is the teacher who sees
it for what it is, and rarer still is the teacher who inspires his or her students to
see it that way. I am very grateful to have been taught by one of those teachers.
In this article, I pay tribute to the teacher who taught me the basic principles
of contract law by drawing on those principles to establish certain fundamental
features of contractual liability. Professor McCamus not only conveyed to his
students his deep respect for the authority of case law and for legal history
(drawing often on his rich understanding of the history of the common law),
but he also taught us that part of what it is to respect the common law is to call
on it to justify itself and to scrutinize without compromise the answers it gives. I
hope that some of the same sense of respect through rigorous scrutiny is reflected
in what follows.

I. INTRODUCTION
Legal orthodoxy has it that contractual obligations are voluntary. It is this that
separates contract from tort on the map of civil obligations. Whereas tortious
duties arise by operation of law, liability in contract is traditionally understood to
be voluntarily created by the parties themselves.1
1.

According to PS Atiyah: “Broadly speaking, the law of contract is that part of the law which
deals with obligations which are self-imposed.” PS Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of
Contract, 5th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1 [Atiyah, Law of Contract].
According to Stephen A Smith: “The traditional and still orthodox view of the nature of
contractual obligations is that they are self-imposed promissory obligations.” Stephen A
Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 56 [Smith, Contract
Theory] [emphasis omitted].
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What is it that distinguishes an obligation as voluntary? In an attenuated
sense, every obligation that is knowingly acquired by an agent who could
have avoided it is a “voluntary” obligation. But this conception of voluntary
obligations does not capture the distinctive and robust sense in which the
obligations of contracts are typically understood to be voluntary. After all, most
legal obligations can be acquired knowingly or intentionally, including those of
the tortious or criminal variety. The drifter who commits an offence on a bitter
winter’s night with the aim of becoming bound to spend time detained in a warm
cell has acquired that obligation voluntarily, but the obligation is not properly
described as a “voluntary” one.2
The voluntariness of an obligation is a property not of the mental state
of the agent who acquires it but of the conditions under which the obligation
obtains (i.e., its triggering conditions).3 The reason the drifter’s duty to submit
to incarceration is not voluntary is that his intention to acquire it played no role
in his having acquired it. What distinguishes an obligation as voluntary is that it
obtains only if the obligor intends to acquire it. A voluntary obligation is one that
depends on the intention of the obligor to take it on. Contractual obligations
are voluntary in this robust sense, then, if and only if the law requires that an
agreement is enforceable as a contract only if the parties intended to create legal
obligations when they made it.4
Is such a requirement part of Canadian law? One need not look far to find
judicial assertions of such a requirement. Indeed, statements to the effect that a
contract is formed only if the parties intend to create legal obligations (or “legal

2.

3.

4.

Neil MacCormick, “Voluntary Obligations” in Neil MacCormick, ed, Legal Right and Social
Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)
190 at 190.
Joseph Raz makes this point. See Joseph Raz, “Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers”
(1972) 46:1 Proc Aristotelian Soc’y Supp 79; Joseph Raz, “Promises in Morality and Law”,
Book Review of Promises, Morals, and Law by PS Atiyah, (1982) 95:4 Harv L Rev 916.
As I use the term in this article, “agreement” is to be construed liberally as embracing all
arrangements that evince the kind of consensus necessary to attract the law of contract.
In this article, I am concerned only with the extent to which an intention to create legal
relations must be part of this consensus.
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relations”) are scattered throughout the law reports.5 Nevertheless, scholars often
doubt that such a requirement is in fact part of the common law of contract, in
Canada or elsewhere.6 These skeptics point out that the law is more about what
judges do than about what they say, and in most contracts cases judges do not
even address whether the parties intended their agreement to be legally binding.
Genuine factual inquiries into the issue are quite unusual.7
Of course, courts occasionally do purport to refuse to enforce agreements on
the basis that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. Balfour v Balfour,8

5.

6.

7.

8.

For the classic statement of that, see Balfour v Balfour, [1919] 2 KB 571, [1918-19] All
ER Rep 860 at 864 (Eng) [Balfour]. Atkin LJ wrote of most domestic agreements that “[t]
hey are not contracts … because the parties did not intend that they should be attended by
legal consequences.” See also Carman Construction v CPR, [1982] 1 SCR 958 at para 19,
136 DLR (3d) 193. The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement made during a
tendering process was not enforceable as a collateral contract because such contracts “must
be established, as in the case of any other contract, by proof of an intention to contract.”
In Matchim v BGI Atlantic Inc, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held
that “intention to create legal relations. … [must] be present to constitute an enforceable
contract.” Matchim v BGI Atlantic Inc, 2010 NLCA 9 at para 21, 294 Nfld & PEIR 46. In a
case involving an agreement of purchase and sale made by an exchange of e-mails, the court
approached the question of enforceability by asking a “fundamental question: Was there an
intention to create legal relations?” See Girouard v Druet, 2012 NBCA 40 at para 3, 349
DLR (4th) 116.
Numerous authors have doubted that there is a genuine requirement of an intention to
create legal relations in contract law, independent of the doctrines of offer, acceptance, and
consideration. See e.g. Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed by Richard
A Lord, vol 1 (Rochester, NY: Lawyers Cooperative, 1990) s 3.5; Atiyah, Law of Contract,
supra note 1, ch 7; Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2d ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis,
2009) ch 2.4; BA Hepple, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 28:1 Cambridge LJ
122; Andrew Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract” (2005) 29:1 Melbourne
UL Rev 179 [Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness”]. Section 21 of the Restatement of
Law, Second: Contracts provides that no intention to create legal relations is required to form
a contract. See Restatement of the Law, Second: Contracts 2d (St. Paul, MN: American Law
Institute, 1981) [Restatement of Law (Second)].
The orthodox explanation for this is that since the law presumes that parties who were at
arm’s length when they negotiated their bargain had the requisite legal intention, triers of fact
are rarely called upon to investigate whether the parties actually had such an intention. But
this orthodox answer will not satisfy the skeptic who doubts that it is a genuine requirement
of a contract that the parties intend to create legal relations. From the skeptic’s point of
view, it is more likely that courts rarely assess whether the parties to an agreement intended
to be legally bound because the question is of no legal relevance, rather than that it is of
fundamental legal importance but there is seldom any doubt about the matter.
Balfour, supra note 5. See also Jones v Padavatton, [1969] 2 All ER 616, [1969] 1 WLR 328
(Eng), Danckwerts and Fenton Atkinson LJJ.
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the most celebrated example of such a case, has Canadian progeny.9 But the
Balfour line of cases does not silence the skeptics. Certainly it is true that where
friends, intimates, or parties otherwise not at arm’s length make agreements, the
courts often refuse to enforce them, ostensibly on the basis that the parties did
not intend their agreement to have legal consequences. But cases like Balfour
provide only ambiguous evidence of the reality of a contractual requirement of
an intention to be legally bound. There are reasons for thinking that the law of
contract ought not to concern itself with strictly domestic and social agreements
that are unrelated to the intentions of the parties.10 So when courts refuse to
enforce such agreements by invoking facts about intentions that they seldom
even investigate in relation to other kinds of agreements, the skeptics respond,
plausibly, that these cases actually have little to do with the intentions of the
parties. The “intention to create legal relations” requirement invoked in the
Balfour line of cases is, the skeptics insist, merely a fiction used by judges to limit
the extent to which the law enforces non-arm’s length agreements or agreements
that are outside of the market. It is a tool for “keeping contract in its place.”11
In this article, I invoke a different line of cases against the skeptics
in support of the thesis that parties to a contract must intend to be legally
obligated by their agreement. The cases I invoke are those in which the parties
are explicit that they do not intend their agreement to be legally binding. When
parties purport to remove their agreement from the ambit of the law in this
way, I say that they have issued a “disclaimer.” If a disclaimer clearly expresses
the intentions of both parties, it will always be effective in precluding either
party from enforcing the agreement as a contract. Contractual obligations are,
in other words, disclaimer-sensitive: They do not obtain if the parties have
included a disclaimer in their agreement. The decision in Rose & Frank Company
v JR Crompton and Brothers Limited, in which the House of Lords refused to

See e.g. Steinberg v Steinberg (1963), 45 DLR (2d) 162, 45 WWR 562 (Sask QB); Buchmaier
v Buchmaier (1971), 6 RFL 382 (available on Quicklaw) (BCCA); Rogalsky Estate v Rogalsky
(1984), 32 Man R (2d) 223, 30 ACWS (2d) 165 (Man QB); Decorby v Decorby (1989), 57
Man R (2d) 241, 14 ACWS (3d) 230 (Man CA).
10. See e.g. Jill Poole, Textbook on Contract Law, 11th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) s 5.2; Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Consideration and Serious Intention” [2009] 2 Sing JLS
434 at 452-53; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) at 297-98.
11. Stephen Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforceability
of Informal Agreements” (1985) 5:3 Oxford J Legal Stud 391 at 391 [Hedley, “Keeping
Contract in its Place”].

9.
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enforce an agreement that included an unambiguous “honour” clause, is the
best-known authority for this proposition.12
Disclaimer-sensitivity is a striking feature of contractual obligations
that stands in need of explanation. Why should parties who make a bargain
while disavowing an intention to acquire a legal obligation not acquire one, if
making a bargain otherwise attracts such an obligation? What accounts for the
normative difference that disclaimers make? I argue in what follows that the
most plausible explanation is that contractual obligations are voluntary. I argue,
in other words, that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, then they
must also be voluntary.

II. VOLUNTARINESS AND THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO
INTENTIONS
Before examining the relationship between disclaimer-sensitivity and
voluntariness, I address a preliminary matter. Assume for the moment that there
is a genuine contractual requirement that the parties must intend to create legal
obligations. The intentions with which such a requirement is concerned will not
always be those that the parties actually possessed. Here, as elsewhere in contract
law, one will sometimes be deemed to have intended what others reasonably
inferred from one’s words and deeds that one intended.13 The law will substitute
a person’s objective intentions for his actual intentions where this is required to
ensure that contracts fulfill their function of permitting parties to order their
affairs in reliance on them.

12. [1924] UKHL 2, [1925] AC 445 [Rose & Frank]. See also Ferrera v Littlewoods Pools Ltd
(1998), [1998] EWCA Civ 618 (Eng); Halloway v Cuozzo (1999), EWCA Civ 746 (Eng).
Disclaimers are often incorporated into so-called “comfort letters.” When disclaimers are
clear and unambiguous, they render these letters unenforceable. See Toronto-Dominion Bank
v Leigh Instruments Ltd (Trustee of ) (1999), 45 OR (3d) 417, 124 OAC 87 (Ont CA).
13. Thus courts determine the meaning of a word or phrase in a contract not by reference to
what the drafter intended it to mean, but by reference to what a reasonable person in the
other party’s position would take the drafter to have intended. See e.g. Water Street Pictures
Ltd v Forefront Releasing Inc, 2006 BCCA 459 at paras 30-43, 57 BCLR (4th) 212.
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Despite some dramatic remarks by some judges and scholars to the contrary,14
I suspect that this substitution does not seriously undermine the thesis that
contractual obligations are voluntary. In the first place, bargaining parties are
generally adept at interpreting each other’s intentions. Objective intent is usually
excellent evidence of actual intent, and the substitution by a court of objective
intention for a divergent actual intention is therefore rare.
More fundamentally, the rule that an objective intention to be legally bound
will suffice to generate contractual liability, far from repudiating the idea that
contractual obligations are voluntary, is in fact evidence that the law takes this
idea seriously. The rule protects promisees by permitting them to rely on their
own reasonable assessment of whether they have a contract with the promisor—
that is, of whether the requirements of contract formation have been satisfied.
The reason that a contract may be created by a party who displays an objective
intention to be legally obligated is precisely that contracts can be formed only
by parties who subjectively intend to be legally obligated. The law construes a
merely apparent intention as a genuine intention just insofar as that is necessary
to protect a promisee in his or her reasonable inference that the promisor had the
requisite genuine intention. The rule concerning the sufficiency of an objective
intention to be legally obligated is therefore not a fundamental rule of contract
formation. Rather, it is a rule about how the basic requirement of actual legal
intention can be satisfied in certain exceptional cases.
I do not pretend to have reconciled objectivity and voluntariness with this
brief argument; the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in contract formation
is a vexing one that is beyond my scope here.15 It is enough for my purposes to

14. For example, in Hotchkiss v National City Bank of New York, the court held: “A contract
has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.
A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties,
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.” See Hotchkiss v
National City Bank of New York, 200 F 287 at 293 (Dist Ct NY 1911). See also Atiyah states:
“Every law student is taught from his earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it
seems; actual subjective intent is normally irrelevant. It is the appearance, the manifestation
of intent that matters.” PS Atiyah, Essays on Contract (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986) at 21. See also Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness,” supra note 6 at 187ff.
15. For a sampling of the scholarly debate, see JR Spencer, “Signature, Consent, and the Rule
in L’Estrange v Graucob” (1973) 32:1 Cambridge LJ 104; William Howarth, “The Meaning
of Objectivity in Contract” (1984) 100:2 Law Q Rev 265; JP Vorster, “A Comment on the
Meaning of Objectivity in Contract” (1987) 103:2 Law Q Rev 274; David Goddard, “The
Myth of Subjectivity” (1987) 7:3 LS 263; DW McLauchlan, “Objectivity in Contract”
(2005) 24:2 UQLJ 479; Brian Coote, “Reflections on Intention in the Law of Contract”
[2006] 2 NZL Rev 183.
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show that objectivity is not the obvious and conclusive answer to voluntariness
that it is often taken to be. In what follows, I use the word “intention” in an
undifferentiated way to refer to whichever kind of intention, actual or objective,
the law is concerned with under the circumstances. An obligation can thus be
voluntary in the robust sense that I have defined, even though it can obtain in
the absence of an actual intention to acquire it. For the reasons I have outlined,
I think the nexus between objective and actual intention in the law of contract
justifies using the term “voluntary” to refer to contractual obligations if they
depend on either phenomenon. But nothing in my article turns on the use of this
term, and if the reader prefers, he or she may substitute ‘voluntary’ (with scare
quotes) for “voluntary” in what follows.

III. EXPLAINING DISCLAIMER-SENSITIVITY
Rose & Frank and cases like it establish that parties who qualify their agreements
with a disclaimer thereby avoid contractual liability.16 In other words, contractual
obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. I argue that this feature of contractual
obligations can be explained in a plausible way only if contractual obligations are
voluntary. I argue, in other words, that if contractual obligations are disclaimersensitive, then they must also be voluntary.
The truth of this claim is not obvious, but it is sometimes assumed to be.
Courts and commentators often invoke cases like Rose & Frank to support
the view that there is a requirement of legal intention in contract formation,
i.e., that contractual obligations are voluntary.17 Some of these authors seem
to assume that voluntariness can be inferred from disclaimer-sensitivity in the
following simple way: A disclaimer is evidence that the parties had no intention
to generate legal obligations when making their agreement; a disclaimer prevents
an agreement from generating a contractual obligation; therefore, agreements

16. See supra note 12.
17. Many of those text-writers from Commonwealth jurisdictions that take the view that
contracts require an intention to create legal relations discuss Rose & Frank in connection
with that requirement, and Professor McCamus is no exception. See John D McCamus, The
Law of Contracts, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) ch 4. See also Edwin Peel, Treitel: The
Law of Contract, 12th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at 177; Bruce MacDougall,
Introduction to Contracts (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2007) at 48; J Beatson, Anson’s Law
of Contract, 28th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 71, n 277; Mindy
Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 114.
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generate contractual obligations only if they are made with an intention to create
legal obligations.18
This simple inference from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness is too
quick. It presupposes that disclaimers preclude contractual obligations because
they are evidence that the parties did not intend to create legal obligations. If
disclaimers were evidence of this fact, and of no other fact, then an inference
from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness would follow. But disclaimers reveal
not only that the parties lacked the intent to create a legal obligation, they also
reveal that the parties intended not to create a legal obligation. These two facts
are not the same. That the parties to an agreement intend not to create legal
obligations entails that they do not intend to create legal obligations, but the
entailment does not go in the other direction. Imagine two parties making an
agreement who are unaware that there is any law relating to the making and
keeping of agreements. Arthur Linton Corbin wrote of an agreement to trade a
horse for a cow by “two ignorant persons who never heard of a legal relation and
who do not know that society offers any kind of a remedy for the enforcement of
such an agreement.”19 These farmers have no intention to create legal obligations,
but they do not intend their agreement not to create such obligations.
In light of this, we can see why voluntariness cannot be inferred from
disclaimer-sensitivity in a straightforward way. Disclaimers reveal two distinct
facts about the intentions of the parties, and it is not obvious to which of them
the law responds when it refuses to enforce disclaimer-qualified agreements. Are
such agreements unenforceable because of the intention (to be legally bound)
that disclaimers reveal to be absent, or because of the intention (not to be legally
bound) that they reveal to be present?
I argue that the latter possibility is not plausible. If I am right about this,
then it must follow that it is the absence of an intention to be legally bound to
which the law responds when it refuses to enforce an agreement that is qualified
by a disclaimer—that is, contractual obligations must be voluntary. In other
words, if I am right then it follows from the disclaimer-sensitivity of contractual
obligations that they are voluntary.
The skeptic will agree with me that a simple inference from disclaimersensitivity to voluntariness is impermissible but will resist my claim that
18. This inference is rarely made explicit but it is the most plausible way to make sense of those
who invoke Rose & Frank as authority for (or even as pertaining to) the voluntariness of
contractual obligations.
19. Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of
Contract Law, vol 1, revised ed (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co, 1963) s 34 at 135.
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disclaimer-sensitivity can be plausibly explained only if contractual liability is
voluntary. At least one skeptic has advanced an argument along these lines. In a
well-known article, Stephen Hedley argued that there is no “necessary connection”
between disclaimer cases like Rose & Frank and a requirement that contracting
parties intend to create legal obligations.20 While these cases “mesh perfectly”
with such a requirement, they do not provide any independent evidence of such
a requirement since “the fact that a rule of law may be excluded by the intentions
of the parties does not show that the rule itself is based on those intentions.”21
Hedley’s point appears to be that these cases also mesh perfectly with a rule
permitting parties to exclude contractual liability intentionally by means of a
disclaimer. On this view, Rose & Frank and its ilk are cases about the legal efficacy
of disclaimers, not about the intention to create legal obligations.
Hedley does not develop his objection any further than this, apparently
regarding it as more or less obvious. In what follows I argue that this point is
mistaken. There is no plausible way to justify cases like Rose & Frank, which
establish that contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, unless such
obligations are also voluntary.

IV. VOLUNTARINESS OR AVOIDABILITY?
Let C represent the set of necessary and sufficient conditions (c1, c2, c3, ... cn) under
which the parties to an agreement acquire an enforceable contractual obligation
(O) to adhere to the agreement. C includes, for example, conditions requiring
that the parties provide consideration, that the agreement be sufficiently complete
and certain, and so on. Now imagine two parties, A and B, who negotiate an
agreement with each other in two possible worlds. In the first world, W1, all of
the conditions in C are satisfied and the parties acquire O. The second world, W2,
is the nearest possible world to W1 in which the parties qualify their agreement by
a disclaimer. Since O is disclaimer-sensitive, the parties acquire O in W1 but not
in W2. One or more of the antecedents of O (c1, c2, c3, … cn) is not satisfied in
W2. What is it about O that explains why our parties acquire it in the first world
but not in the second? By virtue of what feature of contractual obligations is this
difference to be explained?
From the discussion in Part III, above, of what disclaimers reveal about
parties’ intentions, two possible explanations present themselves. The first is that
contractual obligations are voluntary. On this view, C includes a voluntariness
20. Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place,” supra note 11 at 399.
21. Ibid at 400, 401 [emphasis removed].
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condition, cv, by virtue of which O obtains only if the parties intended to create
legal obligations when they made their agreement. I refer to this view as the
“Voluntariness Thesis”:
Voluntariness Thesis: The law enforces an agreement as a contract only if the parties
intended their agreement to create legal obligations.

The second possible explanation for disclaimer-sensitivity is that contractual
obligations do not depend on an intention to create legal obligations but rather
that such obligations are precluded if the parties intend that their agreement
is not to create legal obligations. On this view cv is not included in C, but C
includes an “avoidability” condition, ca, by virtue of which O is not acquired if
the parties intend to avoid becoming legally obligated by their agreement. I call
this the “Avoidability Thesis”:
Avoidability Thesis: The fact that the parties to an agreement did not intend to
become legally obligated by their agreement is irrelevant to whether it ought to be
enforced, but the fact that they intended to avoid becoming legally obligated by
their agreement is a sufficient reason not to enforce it.

This thesis is presupposed by section 21 of the American Restatement of
Law (Second), which provides that “[n]either real nor apparent intention that
a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may
prevent the formation of a contract.”22
Contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It follows from this that
either the Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true. (They
cannot both be true.) I proceed now to argue that the Avoidability Thesis is false.

V. A REDUCTIO OF THE AVOIDABILITY THESIS
According to the Avoidability Thesis, contractual obligations are avoidable but
not voluntary. I argue that this thesis is not plausible. My argument takes the
form of a reductio. The Avoidability Thesis implies, first, that A and B acquire O
in W1 even if they did not intend to acquire it, and, second, that the fact that A
and B intended to avoid acquiring O in W2 is a sufficient reason for not imposing
O on them in W2. The Avoidability Thesis therefore implies that the following
proposition (P) is true:

22. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21.
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Proposition (P): The fact that A and B intended to avoid acquiring O when making
their agreement in W2 is a sufficient reason to preclude them from acquiring O,
notwithstanding that their having made the same agreement with no such intention
in W1 was sufficient to justify imposing O on them.

I claim that this proposition is implausible. The fact that A and B intended
to avoid acquiring O when making their agreement in W2 cannot be a sufficient
reason to preclude them from acquiring O, if their having made the same
agreement was a sufficient reason for imposing O on them in W1.
Unless an obligation is voluntary, the fact that a party intends to avoid
acquiring it when he or she behaves in a certain manner is irrelevant to whether
he or she will acquire that obligation when he or she behaves in that manner. The
party’s intention to avoid acquiring the obligation is normatively inert, in the
sense specified by the following principle:
Inertness Principle: My plea that in doing some act ȕ (e.g., making an agreement
with you) I intended to avoid acquiring an obligation to you to do ĳ (e.g., to fulfill
the terms of the agreement) cannot excuse my not doing ĳ if my doing ȕ with no
such intention is sufficient to obligate me to you to do ĳ.

I take the truth of this principle to be more or less obvious. If I do ȕ with
no intention of acquiring (or avoiding) an obligation to you to do ĳ, and I
thereby acquire an obligation to you to do ĳ, then that obligation is presumably
grounded in some interest you have in my doing ĳ after having done ȕ. And the
normative force of this interest cannot be reduced by my intention or desire that
it be reduced. If by taking another’s property one becomes obligated to return
it, then if I take your bicycle I thereby acquire an obligation to return it even if I
intended to avoid such an obligation when I took it.
If the Inertness Principle is true, then proposition P must be false, and since
P is entailed by the Avoidability Thesis, the latter thesis is also false. Since the
Avoidability Thesis is false, the Voluntariness Thesis must be true.

VI. THE INTERNALIZATION STRATEGY
One way to defend the Avoidability Thesis against my reductio is to argue that
when the law gives effect to a disclaimer, it is simply giving effect to the parties’
agreement. On this view, the law enforces agreements as contracts even if the
parties do not intend to be legally bound by them and disclaimers are terms
in agreements, enforced like any other term. In other words, disclaimers are
internal to agreements and disclaimer-sensitivity follows from the law’s respect for
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agreements.23 This view finds its most authoritative expression in the comments
to section 21 of the Restatement, which explain that, “[p]arties to what would
otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that their legal relations are
not to be affected. … [S]uch a term is respected by the law like any other term.”24
The first difficulty with the internalization strategy is that it seems to be
incoherent. It holds that the law gives effect to disclaimers because they are terms
in agreements, and agreements are enforceable. But to give effect to a disclaimer
is to render unenforceable the agreement of which it is a part. The internalization
strategy therefore implies, incoherently, that an agreement with a disclaimer in it
is unenforceable only to the extent that it is enforceable.25
Even if this logical problem can be remedied, the internalization strategy
seems to beg the question that it seeks to answer—namely, why the law gives effect
to disclaimers. The strategy purports to explain the legal force of disclaimers by
internalizing them to agreements and invoking the enforceability of agreements
as an explanation. On this view agreements are enforced, and disclaimers have
legal effect because they are terms in agreements. This suggests a picture of an
agreement as a kind of enforcing container that confers legal effect on any terms
that are poured into it. But this is not quite right. The law does not enforce
terms (merely) because they are contained within agreements; it enforces terms
because they comprise agreements. An agreement consists in its terms, and the
law enforces agreements just insofar as it enforces the terms that comprise them.
23. I argued that the Avoidability Thesis entails proposition P, which falls foul of the Inertness
Principle. The internalization strategy avoids this reductio by denying that the Avoidability
Thesis entails proposition P. According to that proposition, A and B did the same thing (ȕ) in
W1 and W2—they made the same agreement—albeit with different intentions. According to
the internalization strategy, however, A and B did not do the same thing in W1 and W2, for
if disclaimers form part of the agreements that they qualify, then A and B did not make the
same agreement in W2 that they made in W1. In W2 the parties made their agreement with
the mutual intention that it not be legally binding and that mutual intention became part of
their agreement in W2.
24. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21. See also Smith, Contract Theory, supra note 1
at 212-13; MP Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed (London,
UK: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2001) at 127; Atiyah, Law of Contract, supra note 1 at 153.
25. It may be urged that this charge of incoherence is mistaken because a disclaimer does
not render unenforceable the entire agreement of which it is a part. Rather, it renders
unenforceable all the terms in the agreement other than the disclaimer itself. But this move
will not work. The internalization strategy insists that a disclaimer is to be treated like any
other term in an enforceable agreement. But if a disclaimer is treated as enforceable only
to the extent that the other terms are enforceable, then the internalization strategy implies,
absurdly, that a disclaimer renders all the other terms unenforceable just to the extent that all
those terms are enforceable.
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The internalization strategy is plausible, therefore, only if disclaimers are terms of
a kind that the law enforces. But disclaimers seem very different from the kinds
of terms that render agreements enforceable.
Agreements that are enforceable as contracts consist of terms that supply the
agreements with content by specifying the states of affairs that fulfill or violate
them. These terms are of three kinds. The first are “performance-terms” that
stipulate what the agreement requires of the parties by way of performance. The
second are “warranty-terms” that provide that if certain facts not related to the
actions of the parties do not obtain, then the agreement is violated (e.g., a term
warranting the provenance of the goods sold). Conditions are a third kind of
term. A condition specifies the circumstances under which other terms become
or cease to be part of the agreement.
Disclaimers are unlike any of these three kinds of ordinary terms. Disclaimers
express the parties’ intentions with respect to the legal force of their agreement.
They do not supply the agreement with content by specifying the circumstances
under which it is violated. Rather, disclaimers purport to deprive the agreement
of its status as a contract; they aim to determine its status in law rather than
its scope as an agreement. “This is a (morally) binding agreement,” declares a
disclaimer, “but it is not a contract.”
This difference between ordinary terms and disclaimers is a problem for the
internalization strategy. An agreement comprising ordinary terms is enforceable,
and therefore agreements are enforceable by virtue of having contents that define
the circumstances under which they are violated. The contractual status of an
agreement is, in other words, a function of its being an agreement capable of
being fulfilled or violated as an agreement. Since disclaimers do not define
the content of an agreement in this way, their status as terms in an agreement
cannot explain their legal force because they are not the kind of terms that make
agreements enforceable. By the internalization strategy’s own lights, the law
respects agreements not as juristic acts or intentional exercises of legal power
but as pre-legal arrangements by which the parties mutually commit themselves
to ensure that certain states of affairs obtain. There is no reason to think that
because the law lends its force to such arrangements, it therefore also gives effect
to declarations in such arrangements that they are not to have contractual status.
To summarize, the claim that disclaimers are “respected by the law just like
any other term”26 is either mistaken or question-begging. If the claim is that
disclaimers are just like any other term, it is mistaken. Conceived as terms,
disclaimers are status-determining rather than content-providing. If the claim
26. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21.
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is rather that the law treats disclaimers just like any other term by affording
them the same legal effect, then it generates the very question that it purports to
answer—namely, why does the law give effect to disclaimers?

VII. CONCLUSION
Rose & Frank and its progeny establish that contractual obligations are disclaimersensitive. This striking feature of contractual obligations is often discussed by
text-writers and judges in connection with a requirement that contracting parties
must intend to create legal obligations. The precise nature of the relationship
between this requirement and disclaimer-sensitivity is, however, rarely examined
or made explicit. If the requirement of legal intention were manifestly part of the
law of contract—if it were axiomatic that contractual obligations are voluntary—
then disclaimer-sensitivity could be explained as a corollary of that feature. But
voluntariness is a disputed characteristic of contractual obligations. Skeptics of
the Voluntariness Thesis abound. Few, however, are those who would deny that
contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It would be fruitful, therefore, to
be able to derive the disputed requirement that contracting parties must intend
to create legal obligations from the settled premise that contractual obligations
are disclaimer-sensitive. That is what I have attempted to do here.
It is sometimes assumed that the voluntariness of contractual obligations
follows straightforwardly from the fact that they are disclaimer-sensitive. I have
argued that no such straightforward inference is possible. The relationship
between these two features is more complex than previous writers appear to have
appreciated. I have argued that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive,
then either the Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true; that
the Avoidability Thesis cannot be sustained; and that, therefore, the Voluntariness
Thesis is true.
I first encountered the idea of disclaimer-sensitivity—the notion that
contractual obligations can be avoided by disavowing an intention to create
them—as a first-year student in Professor McCamus’s classroom. I like to think
that my former teacher will find my arguments in this article persuasive. But
more than that, I hope that he will take some pride in having helped to inspire in
one of his students a passion for the law of contract sufficient to cause him still to
be writing and thinking about its foundations all these years later.

